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Abstract
Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide state-of-the-art results on various tasks and are
widely used in real world applications. However, it was discovered that machine learn-
ing models, including the best performing DNNs, suffer from a fundamental problem:
they can unexpectedly and confidently misclassify examples formed by slightly perturb-
ing otherwise correctly recognized inputs. Various approaches have been developed for
efficiently generating these so-called adversarial examples, but those mostly rely on as-
cending the gradient of loss. In this paper, we introduce the novel logits optimized tar-
geting system (LOTS) to directly manipulate deep features captured at the penultimate
layer. Using LOTS, we analyze and compare the adversarial robustness of DNNs using
the traditional Softmax layer with Openmax, which was designed to provide open set
recognition by defining classes derived from deep representations, and is claimed to be
more robust to adversarial perturbations. We demonstrate that Openmax provides less
vulnerable systems than Softmax to traditional attacks, however, we show that it can be
equally susceptible to more sophisticated adversarial generation techniques that directly
work on deep representations.
1 Introduction
In recent years, deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated impressive performance
improvements on a wide range of challenging machine learning tasks [5, 6, 10, 17]. Despite
the excellent results, our understanding of these networks is in question following the re-
vealed intriguing properties of machine learning models [16]. Since DNNs are able to learn
high-level feature embeddings – allowing them to be successfully adapted to different prob-
lems – and generalize well, the discovery of adversarial examples by Szegedy et al. [16] was
rather astonishing. Due to the excellent generalization properties, DNNs were expected to
be robust to moderate distortions to their inputs, however, even imperceptibly small adver-
sarial perturbations yield altered classifications. Closely related to the problem of adversarial
vulnerability, Nguyen et al. [9] demonstrated that DNNs can also confidently misclassify the
so-called fooling examples that are totally unrecognizable to humans.
The advances in deep learning boosts various research areas. DNNs optimized for spe-
cific tasks can learn representations that generalize well to other datasets [10, 18], and the
This is a pre-print of the original paper accepted at the British Machine Vision Conference (BMVC) 2017.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
01
69
7v
1 
 [c
s.C
V]
  5
 A
ug
 20
17
2 ROZSA et al.: ADVERSARIAL ROBUSTNESS: SOFTMAX VERSUS OPENMAX
extracted generic descriptors can be successfully used for other problems [2, 14] as well.
Therefore deep features extracted from these networks are widely used in the literature – e.g.,
for different visual recognition tasks in biometrics [8, 10, 15, 18] – even where the application
of an end-to-end classification network would not be applicable.
One interesting application of the extracted generic descriptors is to “open” the tradi-
tionally closed set nature of end-to-end classification DNNs. While recognition in the real
world is open set and a trained recognition system should ideally reject unknown or unseen
classes, DNNs are forced to choose from one of the known classes for any given input – even
if humans do not consider them meaningful. To address the problem, Bendale and Boult
[1] introduced a new network layer called Openmax, which estimates the probability of an
input being from an unknown class and, thereby, provides an open set recognition solution
for DNNs. After evaluating open set DNNs built upon pre-trained networks from the Caffe
Model Zoo1 on the ILSVRC-2012 validation dataset [12], the authors concluded that Open-
max improves the robustness of those networks to adversarial and fooling images – by either
correcting or detecting those – and their robustness significantly outperforms basic DNNs as
well as DNNs using thresholds for Softmax probabilities.
In this paper, we introduce the logits optimized targeting system (LOTS) designed to per-
turb samples in such ways that their deep feature representations mimic any selected target
activations at the penultimate layer, which are also called logits. We demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of LOTS in terms of forming high quality adversarial and unrecognizable examples
by targeting classes in two ways including mimicking the mean activation vectors (MAV) of
classes Openmax uses for open set recognition. We analyze and compare the robustness to ad-
versarial and unrecognizable images of the BVLC-GoogLeNet network using the traditional
Softmax layer with the same network utilizing Openmax. Our results show that Openmax
outperforms the traditional Softmax layer when LOTS is used to directly target classes, how-
ever, it is equally vulnerable to adversarial and unrecognizable images when LOTS is utilized
to mimic the class representations that Openmax relies on.
2 Related Work
Since adversarial examples were discovered, researchers have proposed various approaches
capable of reliably finding such perturbations. While the first method of Szegedy et al. [16]
relied on the computationally expensive box-constrained optimization technique (L-BFGS),
Goodfellow et al. [4] introduced a more lightweight, yet very effective approach – called the
fast gradient sign (FGS) – which relies on the sign of the gradient of loss with respect to the
input. Rozsa et al. [11] later demonstrated that with a slight modification of FGS, namely,
by dropping the use of the sign, the formalized fast gradient value (FGV) approach generates
very different, high quality adversarial examples.
The aforementioned adversarial generation techniques simply ascend the gradient of train-
ing loss for the given input until the particular original class does not have the highest pre-
diction probability. Recently, Kurakin et al. [7] proposed extensions over the simple FGS
method in order to be able to target a specific class, or by calculating and applying gradients
iteratively compared to using a single gradient via FGS.
Other approaches that do not rely on using the gradient of training loss were also proposed
in the literature. Rozsa et al. [11] introduced the hot/cold approach utilizing a Euclidean loss
1https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/wiki/Model-Zoo
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with arbitrarily selected target classes on the pre-Softmax layer – the so-called logits – and
uses its gradients as directions for forming adversarial perturbations. While this approach
does not use the gradient of the training loss, eventually, it still targets training classes and
cannot be used to directly manipulate deep features.
Unlike the previous techniques, the approach introduced by Sabour et al. [13] forms
adversarial examples that cause misclassifications by mimicking the internal representations
of the targeted inputs. While this method works on deep features and can potentially be used
to attack systems that utilize deep representations extracted from DNNs, it relies on using the
computationally expensive L-BFGS algorithm, which limits its practical application.
The formation of fooling examples, i.e., images that are unrecognizable to humans but
DNNs confidently classify them as recognizable objects, is closely related to adversarial
example generation. In short, one can summarize the difference simply as “painting to a
non-blank canvas having a different background” – where the background is either recogniz-
able or unrecognizable. Nguyen et al. [9] used evolutionary algorithms or gradient ascent for
forming two types of fooling images: indirectly encoded or regular images and directly en-
coded or irregular images. As we can see in Fig. 1(i) and (j), regular images possess patterns,
while irregular images shown in Fig. 1(k) and (l) do not.
To provide open set recognition, Openmax [1] estimates the probabilities of inputs being
unknown by adapting meta-recognition concepts to activation patterns of the penultimate
layer. While deeper features could also be utilized, Openmax working on logits was reported
to greatly reduce the number of obvious classification errors. Ideally, a DNN with Openmax
detects unrecognizable images as unknown and corrects adversarial images by classifying
them as their original class or unknown. The authors tested with and reported their results on
adversarial and fooling images generated on basic DNNs utilizing the Softmax layer.
Since Openmax is implemented external to DNNs and operates on extracted deep fea-
tures, end-to-end adversarial generation techniques cannot be used for forming adversarial or
unrecognizable examples on this layer. Our novel LOTS method is capable of directly ma-
nipulating the deep representations of images that Openmax relies on and, therefore, we can
directly attack DNNs using either the Softmax or Openmax layer. LOTS can be extended to
deeper layers as well, and it shows similarities to the technique of Sabour et al. [13] in terms
of directly adjusting deep features – without using L-BFGS.
3 Approach
This section describes the deep neural networks (DNNs) we experiment with, introduces our
novel approach to form adversarial and unrecognizable images on those systems and, finally,
presents the metric that we use for quantifying the quality of the generated examples.
3.1 Targeted DNNs: Closed Set vs. Open Set Recognition
For our experiments, we use the publicly available BVLC-GoogLeNet2 network, which is
the Berkeley-trained version of the DNN designed by Szegedy et al. [17], optimized on the
ILSVRC-2012 dataset [12]. To compare the robustness of the traditional network with an
open set DNN, we have replaced the Softmax layer with our implementation of Openmax.
Openmax works on extracted deep features of the penultimate layer, which are also called
activation vectors (AVs). First, we have extracted AVs from the 224×224-pixel center crops
2https://github.com/BVLC/caffe/tree/master/models/bvlc_googlenet
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of the correctly classified training images that were rescaled to 256× 256 pixels. Second,
from the extracted activation vectors we have calculated a single point to represent each
known class by using their mean activation vector (MAV). We use Openmax parameters
as defined in [1], and we verified our implementation with the authors. Finally, given an
input image and the MAVs, using the activation vector extracted from the input Openmax
calculates probabilities for known classes and for being unknown. Similarly to Softmax,
Openmax normalizes probabilities to sum up to one. To determine the classification of the
open set DNN, we simply take the class with the highest prediction probability.
3.2 LOTS - Logits Optimized Targeting System
Let us consider a general deep neural network (DNN) f with weights w in a layered structure,
i.e., having layers y(l), l = {1, . . . ,L}, with their corresponding weights w(l). For a given input
x, the output of the DNN can be formalized as:
f (x) = y(L)
(
y(L−1)
(
. . .
(
y(1)(x)
)
. . .
))
, (1)
while the deep feature of input x at layer l is:
f (l)(x) = y(l)
(
y(l−1)
(
. . .
(
y(1)(x)
)
. . .
))
. (2)
Our logits optimized targeting system (LOTS) adjusts the activation vector (AV) of input
xo extracted from the penultimate layer L− 1 (so-called logits) to get closer to a target t. In
order to do so, we use a Euclidean loss defined on the activation vector f (L−1)(xo) of input xo
and the target t, and apply its gradient with respect to input xo, formally:
η(L−1)(xo, t) = ∇xo
(
1
2
∥∥∥t− f (L−1)(xo)∥∥∥2) . (3)
The target t can be chosen without any constraints. Furthermore, LOTS can be applied
to deep features of any layer. We use the activation vectors of the penultimate layer with a
Euclidean loss as Openmax works on logits in a Euclidean space.
To produce high quality examples with less perceptible perturbations, we use LOTS iter-
atively. Our algorithm utilizes a scaled gradient with L∞ = 1 to move faster to the targeted
activation vector until the perturbed image is classified as desired. Iterative LOTS forms im-
age xp with discrete pixel values in [0,255], however, while taking steps towards the target,
it temporarily utilizes x′p with non-discrete pixel values in order to obtain better adversarial
quality. This “step-and-adjust” algorithm extracts the activation vector (AV) of the temporary
image x′p (initialized to xo), calculates the gradient as defined by Eq. (3), and uses that to take
a step to get closer to the target t. These steps are repeated with newly extracted AVs until
the DNN classifies xp as the targeted class.
3.3 Adversarial Quality
To compare the robustness of closed and open set DNNs to adversarial and unrecognizable
images, we need to assess the quality of the produced examples. Although Lp norms are
commonly used to quantify perturbations, researchers [11, 13] concluded that those mea-
sures do not match well to human perception. Therefore, we use the psychometric called
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the perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) introduced by Rozsa et al. [11]. While Lp
norms focus strictly on the perturbation – regardless of its visibility on the distorted image –
PASS is designed to quantify the similarity of the original image xo and the perturbed image
xp with respect to human perception.
To calculate PASS, the image pair is first aligned by maximizing the enhanced correlation
coefficient (ECC) [3] with homography transform Ψ(xp,xo), and then their structural simi-
larity is quantified by using the structural similarity (SSIM) index [19]. The alignment step
via ECC takes place before SSIM calculation as small translations or rotations can remain
imperceptible to the human eye and, therefore, PASS eliminates those before the structural
similarity of the image pair is calculated. In summary, PASS can be formalized as follows:
PASS(xp,xo) = SSIM(Ψ(xp,xo) , xo) , (4)
where PASS(xp,xo) = 1 defines perfect similarity.
Since the structural similarity (SSIM) index can only be calculated on grayscale images,
we align the converted grayscale images using OpenCV’s ECC with termination criteria of
100 iterations or ε = 0.01, and then we calculate the perceptual adversarial similarity score
(PASS) of the aligned images using SSIM.3
4 Experiments
The ultimate goal of this paper is to answer the question whether open set DNNs are less
susceptible to adversarial and unrecognizable images than the traditional closed set DNNs.
This section describes our experiments and presents our results.
4.1 Attacks on Softmax and Openmax
To assess the capabilities of LOTS and compare the robustness of closed and open set DNNs,
we use a dozen images to generate adversarial or unrecognizable examples. While we in-
tended to purely focus on analyzing the robustness of these DNNs to adversarial perturba-
tions, experimenting with unrecognizable images can answer the question whether Openmax
is capable of detecting such samples as unknown. We have selected eight 224×224-pixel cen-
ter crops from the rescaled 256× 256-pixel images of the ILSVRC-2012 validation dataset
that are correctly classified by both the closed and open set DNNs. These images of known
training classes are displayed in Fig. 1(a)-(h). Throughout our experiments, we aim to gen-
erate adversarial examples from these images that are classified incorrectly as other possible
known classes. Considering the 1,000 classes, this yields 999 possible adversarial examples
for each image. To produce unrecognizable images, we use iterative LOTS simply to “paint
on non-blank canvasses that contain unrecognizable objects.” Therefore, we have two regular
images generated by Nguyen et al. [9] shown in Fig. 1(i) and (j) that we rescaled to 224×224
pixels. Due to the combination of rescaling and using a different DNN, these examples are
classified differently than in [9]. To obtain the irregular images displayed in Fig. 1(k) and (l),
we generated two 224×224-pixel images containing uniformly distributed random noise in
[0,255]. As expected, Openmax providing open set recognition classifies these regular and
irregular images as unknown. Considering the classifications of regular and irregular images,
there are 999 and 1,000 known classes to aim at when we form unrecognizable images on the
closed and open set DNNs, respectively.
3http://isit.u-clermont1.fr/~anvacava/codes/ssim.py
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(a) Bee (0.155) (b) Guitar (0.837) (c) Hummingbird (0.876) (d) Marmot (0.393)
(e) Spider Web (0.528) (f) Stingray (0.922) (g) Submarine (0.999) (h) Wine Bottle (0.787)
(i) Regular 1 (1.000) (j) Regular 2 (0.947) (k) Irregular 1 (0.468) (l) Irregular 2 (0.846)
Figure 1: KNOWN, REGULAR, AND IRREGULAR IMAGES. Images in (a)-(h) are correctly
classified by BVLC-GoogLeNet networks with both Softmax and Openmax. While Softmax classifies
regular ((i) coral reef, (j) coil) and irregular ((k) velvet, (l) window screen) images as known classes,
Openmax labels them as unknown. Sub-captions contain the prediction certainty of Openmax.
We conduct four sets of experiments using the iterative logits optimized targeting system
(LOTS) approach (cf. Sec. 3.2). First, on the closed set DNN we use iterative LOTS on
the extracted activation vectors to target known classes. Since LOTS operates on logits, we
define target t at the logits layer that yields one-hot vector in the Softmax layer. Particularly,
to target a specific class we form a class aiming vector (CAV) t with a value of 100 for
the targeted class and −100 for others. This is the traditional way for forming adversarial
perturbations on end-to-end classification networks. Second, we use iterative LOTS on the
closed set DNN for forming adversarial and unrecognizable images by making their AVs
mimic the targeted mean activation vectors (MAVs). Compared to the first approach, LOTS
still works on deep features of images extracted from the same layer, however, this time those
AVs are manipulated to get closer to the MAVs that Openmax relies on.
Third, we use iterative LOTS on the open set DNN to form adversarial and unrecogniz-
able examples with AVs targeting the class aiming vectors (CAVs) as described in the first
approach. Out of our four sets of experiments, this is the closest to the one that Bendale and
Boult [1] ran to assess the robustness of Openmax to adversarial and unrecognizable images.
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(a) PASS = 0.997 (0.100) (b) PASS = 0.996 (0.062) (c) PASS = 0.997 (0.159) (d) PASS = 0.996 (0.330)
(e) PASS = 0.997 (0.244) (f) PASS = 0.998 (0.289) (g) PASS = 0.982 (0.118) (h) PASS = 0.994 (0.215)
(i) PASS = 0.975 (0.367) (j) PASS = 0.992 (0.077) (k) PASS = 0.999 (0.156) (l) PASS = 0.999 (0.173)
Figure 2: PERTURBATIONS ON OPENMAX. These perturbations make Fig. 1 images mimic the
mean activation vector (MAV) of the goldfish class and, thus, they are classified as goldfish. Sub-
captions contain the PASS between original and perturbed images, and the prediction certainty of gold-
fish via Openmax. For better visualization, perturbations are magnified by a factor of 5.
We generate examples on this network, namely, images classified by Openmax as their tar-
geted classes. Fourth, on the open set DNN we use iterative LOTS to form adversarial and
unrecognizable examples with their AVs mimicking the mean activation vectors (MAVs) that
Openmax uses as class representations.
To limit the computational costs, iterative LOTS is restricted to 500 steps. In case this
limit is exceeded for a given image, the attempt is considered a failure. Otherwise, if the
perturbed example is classified as the targeted class, LOTS stops in that particular step –
regardless what the prediction certainty of the network is. This way iterative LOTS pro-
duces adversarial and unrecognizable images that contain the smallest possible perturbations
yielding the desired classifications.
4.2 Results
The results obtained by conducting the four sets of experiments using the selected images of
Fig. 1 are presented in Tab. 1. Comparing the collected metrics on the two types of attacks on
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(a) SM/CAV: PASS = 0.997 (0.282) (b) SM/MAV: PASS = 0.998 (0.269)
(c) OM/CAV: PASS = 0.997 (0.230) (d) OM/MAV: PASS = 0.998 (0.289)
(e) SM/CAV: PASS = 0.972 (0.311) (f) SM/MAV: PASS = 0.972 (0.408)
(g) OM/CAV: PASS = 0.962 (0.245) (h) OM/MAV: PASS = 0.975 (0.367)
Figure 3: SOFTMAX VS. OPENMAX: ADVERSARIAL AND UNRECOGNIZABLE IMAGES.
This figure shows adversarial and regular unrecognizable examples paired with their corresponding
perturbations yielding misclassifications as goldfish on BVLC-GoogLeNet networks with either Soft-
max (SM) or Openmax (OM). Examples are formed by targeting the class aiming vector (CAV) or the
mean activation vector (MAV) of the targeted class. Sub-captions contain the PASS between original
and perturbed images, and the prediction certainty of goldfish via Softmax or Openmax, respectively.
For better visualization, perturbations are magnified by a factor of 5.
the closed set DNN with the Softmax layer, we can conclude that iterative LOTS targeting the
class aiming vector (CAV) produces examples with very similar quality to the other type of
attack where activation vectors mimic mean activation vectors (MAVs) of classes. However,
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Table 1: ADVERSARIAL AND UNRECOGNIZABLE IMAGES. These results are obtained using
iterative LOTS with the listed ImageNet samples as well as regular and irregular images. With each, we
attacked all 999 or 1,000 possible classes by targeting the class aiming vector (CAV) and the mean acti-
vation vector (MAV) of the class. We list the mean and standard-deviation of PASS and the percentage
of successful attacks when perturbed images were classified as their targeted class.
ORIGINAL
IMAGE
SOFTMAX CLASSIFICATION OPENMAX CLASSIFICATION
CAV TARGET MAV TARGET CAV TARGET MAV TARGET
bee 0.995±0.002 (100.0%) 0.993±0.004 (100.0%) 0.990±0.006 (82.3%) 0.992±0.004 (100.0%)
guitar 0.997±0.001 (100.0%) 0.996±0.002 (100.0%) 0.996±0.003 (89.2%) 0.996±0.002 (100.0%)
hummingbird 0.994±0.004 (100.0%) 0.992±0.005 (99.9%) 0.988±0.008 (80.8%) 0.992±0.005 (99.7%)
marmot 0.998±0.001 (100.0%) 0.997±0.002 (99.3%) 0.996±0.003 (64.5%) 0.997±0.002 (99.5%)
spider web 0.993±0.003 (100.0%) 0.991±0.005 (99.9%) 0.988±0.007 (82.0%) 0.991±0.005 (99.9%)
stingray 0.995±0.002 (100.0%) 0.993±0.005 (99.7%) 0.991±0.007 (83.4%) 0.993±0.005 (99.8%)
submarine 0.992±0.003 (99.3%) 0.991±0.004 (96.9%) 0.990±0.005 (76.7%) 0.991±0.004 (97.2%)
wine bottle 0.996±0.002 (100.0%) 0.996±0.002 (99.8%) 0.995±0.003 (91.0%) 0.996±0.002 (99.8%)
regular 1 0.960±0.016 (99.9%) 0.952±0.020 (97.9%) 0.946±0.021 (81.8%) 0.951±0.020 (98.2%)
regular 2 0.995±0.003 (99.6%) 0.993±0.003 (95.0%) 0.994±0.004 (72.9%) 0.993±0.004 (94.7%)
irregular 1 0.999±0.000 (99.9%) 0.999±0.001 (96.1%) 0.999±0.000 (79.3%) 0.999±0.001 (95.6%)
irregular 2 0.999±0.000 (99.0%) 0.999±0.001 (95.0%) 0.999±0.001 (75.3%) 0.999±0.001 (95.1%)
with the former approach LOTS is able to reach the targeted classes more frequently while
forming adversarial and unrecognizable images.
On the open set DNN, iterative LOTS is less effective with CAV targets. We can observe
that while, in general, the quality of the produced examples is maintained at a similarly high
level as on the closed set DNN, a large proportion of the targeted classes cannot be reached.
The proportion of successful attacks varies among the different images, the lowest rate is
measured on the marmot shown in Fig. 1(d) with 64.5%. Contrarily, when iterative LOTS is
used with MAV-targets, Openmax is as vulnerable to adversarial and unrecognizable images
as the closed set DNN with the Softmax layer. This is highlighted by both the quality and the
quantity of the formed examples. To demonstrate how easily the images of known classes, as
well as regular and irregular examples can be turned to a particular known class on the open
set DNN, we show perturbations for each in Fig. 2 that turn images of Fig. 1 to be classified
as goldfish, respectively. For example, the activation vector of a confidently (92.2%) and
correctly classified stingray shown in Fig. 1(f) can be manipulated by the perturbation dis-
played in Fig. 2(f) to achieve the desired classification as goldfish, with 28.9% confidence.
The perturbed example is displayed in Fig. 3(d) – it is a high quality adversarial example
formed by an imperceptibly small perturbation as indicated by the high PASS. Please note
that we magnified those perturbations for better visualization by a factor of 5.
We have conducted statistical tests to compare the quality of the adversarial and unrec-
ognizable images formed on the closed and open set DNNs. We use the computed PASS
when iterative LOTS reached the target, PASS = 0 when iterative LOTS could not form a
perturbation yielding the targeted classification, and PASS = 1 when the original class is
the target (e.g., Fig. 1(i) is labeled as coral reef by Softmax, thus that target is reached).
Two-sided paired t-tests on PASS values show a significant difference (p < 0.00001) be-
tween the images formed on Softmax and Openmax when the class aiming vectors (CAVs)
are utilized. When the mean activation vectors (MAVs) are targeted with iterative LOTS, the
difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.741). The latter result indicates that with the
mean activation vector (MAV) targets the open set DNN is as susceptible to adversarial and
unrecognizable examples formed by iterative LOTS as the closed set network.
Finally, to be able to visually compare the examples formed by the four attack scenarios,
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adversarial and regular unrecognizable images and their perturbations are shown in Fig. 3.
We can observe that iterative LOTS targeting the class aiming vector (CAV) or the mean
activation vector (MAV) of the goldfish class forms similar perturbations on closed and open
set DNNs. However, those similar perturbations yield different prediction probabilities.
5 Conclusion
Adversarial example generation techniques mainly focus on forming examples on end-to-end
classification networks. In this paper, we have introduced our novel logits optimized targeting
system (LOTS) to directly manipulate the deep features of the penultimate layer in order to
form adversarial and unrecognizable images on closed and open set deep neural networks
(DNNs). LOTS can be efficiently used iteratively to form examples on both DNNs. We have
experimentally demonstrated the capabilities of iterative LOTS by generating high quality
adversarial and unrecognizable images that are classified as their targeted classes.
We have conducted experiments to compare the robustness of closed and open set DNNs
to adversarial and unrecognizable images. We have generated adversarial and unrecognizable
examples on the closed set DNN with the Softmax layer and on the open set DNN utilizing
Openmax with two different approaches to target classes. First, we have used iterative LOTS
on activation vectors of the penultimate layer to mimic the specified class aiming vectors
(CAVs) and, second, to get closer to mean activation vectors (MAVs) of classes.
To assess the robustness of these DNNs, we have quantified the quality of the produced
images using the perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS), and we have measured the
percentage of successful attempts when the formed images were classified as intended. A
less vulnerable system allows lower success rates and/or requires more visible perturbations.
Based on the collected metrics, we have concluded that the open set DNN with Openmax is
more robust to adversarial and unrecognizable images when iterative LOTS is used with class
aiming vector (CAV) targets. However, when the mean activation vectors (MAVs) of classes
are targeted, DNNs with Softmax and Openmax are equally vulnerable. While adversarial
and fooling images formed on the Softmax layer can be corrected or detected by Openmax
[1], we have shown a novel and efficient attack on Openmax.
Although we have performed our experiments using the mean activation vectors (MAV)
that Openmax relies on for class representations, we conjecture that very similar results can
be obtained by taking the mean activation vectors of several, arbitrarily selected, and correctly
classified examples and using those as targets. Finally, iterative LOTS can be easily extended
to work on deep feature representations of any layer in DNNs in order to mimic an arbitrary
target representation.
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